Abstract. We present our two separate tools for data protection measurement and evaluation of websites. The rst tool does a generic check on a single website and is openly available for any web user to use when evaluating data protection measures implemented on a website. The second tool was used to perform a more exhaustive evaluation of Swedish municipalities. The work focuses on leakages of personally identiable information to third parties when a web visitor goes to a website, and in our accompanying website we have also identied measures that web developers could undertake, or that web visitors could request, to improve the data protection of their visitors.
Introduction
With the entry into eect of the new EU rules on data protection in May 2018, there is an urgent need for web developers and other actors in society to make preparations. We have developed two separate tools to identify measures which can be undertaken to improve privacy protection in public websites in Sweden.
In particular, they will assist web developers and web strategists to analyse how they are currently leaking personally identiable information (PII) to third parties, as individuals visit their websites.
Our rst tool is a simple technical mechanism for private persons and web developers to evaluate the leakage of PII from websites. 2 In addition, we produced technical advice on how data leakage can be mitigated.
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We have checked the use of web analysis tools, 4 whether a referrer policy is set, 5 the usage or absence of encrypted connections as well as inclusion of third party services (fonts, forums, weather services or text-to-voice services) or the placement of cookies (both persistent tracking cookies and functional cookies).
Additionally, we provide an element of gamication for Swedish municipalities, in that we developed a ve-step grading system. This allows for municipalities to compare their eorts to other municipalities. With current data leakage rates being generally high, we found, however, that no municipalities obtain better than mid-level results.
This study aims to achieve utility for web designers and website developers, with an emphasis on utility for public sector institutions. While there are a number of web browser plug-ins that could be installed by web visitors to mitigate harms arising from persistent online tracking, 6 this paper is guided by the belief that privacy problems can and should be solved close to the source of the problem. We believe similar methodologies and tests could also be useful in other countries, and in so far as possible we have strived to identify cost-neutral improvements. Both of these guidelines target the necessary requirements for end-user terms of service formulations given specic options implemented by the web developer.
Similar tools in the Swedish context
The success rate in terms of increasing adoption rates of globally desired practises varies.
Accessibility guidelines have generally been well-received.
11 While securityoriented projects, such as the guidelines for encrypted connections and DNSSEC are ostensibly taken seriously at the national level, deployment has been slow.
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All of the prior guideline projects have been developed under the auspice of the Swedish national regulatory authority for telecommunications and postal services (PTS). The data protection guidelines focus on contract law, and their success rate is dicult to measure. There are no known cases where the privacy terms of a municipal website or other website have been successfully tried in court.
Methodology
We have constructed tests which are technically more convenient to monitor, and which assume an expansive view of the wordings of the legislation. What this means is that our technical monitoring of websites does not accomodate for exibilities in the law to avoid certain types of data forwarding or data collection by referens to privacy terms. This is for a few reasons.
End-users have been demonstrated not to reasonably have the time or capacity to read and understand such terms of services.
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Having restricted ourselves to investigating municipalities in depth, we deemed it inappropriate to construct a set of tests which would assume the public sector should enter into extensive and dicult to understand agreements with their website visitors.
, We have assumed that it is more interesting for web developers to engage with interesting technical alternatives to monitoring and tracking over engaging with the formulation of terms of services agreements.
Instead we have focused on the ability of web developers to adhere to the data minimisation principle.
14 We have also assumed that adoption of data protection enhancing measures is more likely if website owners and managers are provided with self-measurement and top-listing tools. 14 Art 5.1 c, General Data Protection Regulation.
The Scoring System
We devised a ve-step scoring system for municipalities which runs from E to A, with A being the highest and E the lowest score.
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A To get the highest score, a municipality should neither leak PII to third parties (Internet service providers, mobile providers, content delivery platforms, advertisers, etc.) nor collect unnecessary information for their own use. This means use of HTTPS by default, no persistent rst-party cookies, no thirdparty requests (which implies no third-party cookies), referrer policy set to a restrictive value (i.e., no-referrer), setting the HTTP Strict Transport Security header (HSTS), and no insecure requests (i.e., HTTPS to HTTP). While the scoring system is simple, we have tried not to make it biased towards any particular form of protection against PII leakage. It is, for instance, possible to get at most a C grade without using encrypted connections, but it is not possible to advance beyond a C grade without also remedying PII leakage to third parties. We chose this methodology to ensure that privacy is protected against electronic communications services as well as information society services.
Since we nalised the beta version of our in-depth tool in May 2016, we have produced scores for all Swedish municipalities on three subsequent occasions. The total number of municipalities tested amounted to 290. This called for a typical design where we would have a user-facing frontend server communicating with one or more separate backend servers (which in turn perform the actual visiting and rendering of webpages) through a REST API.
The most resource-intensive part of the infrastructure is the backend. We considered running a real consumer browser such as Firefox through the Selenium framework (as in [1] ), but found that the overhead was too great. It should be noted that while Selenium oers more possibilities and a more stable environment, this was less of a concern here than in our later municipality test. Our online tool is not meant to be used for studies or rigorous analysis, but rather as a starting point for web developers and web visitors. 3) If the URL resulting from 2) has already been checked and is in the database, the old data is fetched and rendered. If the URL is not in the database, or if it is in the database but the user has clicked Check again, we force a new check, and the frontend proceeds to 4). 1) The nal URL is noted. This is the actual page rendered, after any redirects. 2 3) Cookies are split into rst-party and third-party. We also count the number of unique third-party cookie domains. 4 ) From requests, third-party requests and insecure rst-party requests are extracted. Request types (secure vs. insecure) are counted. 5) Using a HTML parser we check whether a referrer policy is set using meta referrer (a referrer policy can also be set in a Content-Security-Policy header;
this is checked at a later point).
All the above is saved to the database and the status of the user's request is updated.
Meanwhile, the user is redirected to a status page where the ID of the request is in the URL. The page is reloaded automatically every ve seconds using meta refresh. On every request the frontend checks the status of the page in the databaseif state has changed, the user is redirected to a results or error page, otherwise the status page is shown again. While there are smoother ways to present status and do transitions, this way we avoid having to use cookies.
Finally, the user is presented with a results page. It shows the following:
Whether HTTPS is used by default; and, if so, whether the site uses HTTP Strict Transport Security, and whether there are any insecure requests.
Whether referrers are leaked. First-party cookies. Third-party cookies. Third-party requests, categorized using Disconnect's public tracker list. Certain HTTP headers that can be benecial for privacy and security: ContentSecurity-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, Public-Key-Pins, X-Content-TypeOptions, X-Frame-Options, X-Xss-Protection. We then wrote a program to enrich the database, mainly using information already contained therein, but made more easily accessible to make it easier to produce statistics and (at a later stage with the same program) generate the reports pages.
30 For example, the http_requests table was extended with columns for base_domain (shortest domain assigned to a registrant; used to determine rst-party vs. third-party cookies/requests) and scheme (HTTP or HTTPS); site_visits was extended was extended with e.g. HSTS value, referrer policy, third-party requests, insecure requests and multiple columns for cookies (rstparty and third-party prole and session cookies). Each municipality was also scored using the criteria mentioned in 2.1.
It should be noted that the results for a municipality are based not on a single page, but on the collected data from the initial page plus up to ve internal pages.
28 https://github.com/Tomtomgo/phearjs/pull/5 29 https://github.com/seomoz/publicsuffix-elixir/pull/17 30 Code (MIT license): https://github.com/andersju/municipality-privacy In our setup OpenWPM did not save the HTML content of pages. As referrer policy can be set in both a HTTP header and in a HTML meta element, we let our post-processing tool visit the initial URL of each municipality website, get and parse the HTML and look for meta referrer.
Finally, our tool generated a static website with 1) an overview with a table containing all municipalities, sortable by score/scheme/referrer leakage/number of cookies/etc., and 2) a detailed results page for each municipality, much like the results pages produced by our web service Webbkoll.
Limitations While we did visit a number of internal links in this test, we are limited by what can be done in an automated fashion when we have no prior knowledge of the sites being visited. The internal links are chosen at random, and at the moment we cannot check whether it is, for example, possible to contact one's municipality in a secure way.
The browse command in OpenWPM 0.6.2 loads a specied URL and then tries to visit a specied number of internal links (from the same hostname as the URL) on the initial page. However, we found that no internal links were visited if the initial URL was a redirect; we thus had to use curl and a few command-line tools to process the list of municipality websites, gure out the nal URL of each website, and then write those URLs to a new le that we then used as input to OpenWPM.
We found a bug that in rare instances would make OpenWPM treat external links as internal. This was reported and xed.
Discussion
The following chapter is based on structured interviews with employees from the Swedish public sector as well as interactions with such employees that we have had since the beginning of our project. These interviews and interactions were, however, conditioned on anonymity of the individual civil servants concerned.
The Municipality of Enköping
We were in touch with civil servants working in the Swedish medium-sized municipality Enköping 31 since before we started our project. The municipality was, and still is, in the process of refurbishing their public-facing web environment.
The municipality lacked prior guidelines for web development beyond graphical proles at the start of the project. The changes in the website could therefore be planned freely by responsible sta. While responsible sta had support for a data protection friendly shift from their immediate superiors in the hierarchy (the communications department), interest was more shallow in the municipal IT department. The data protection focus did, however, receive attention from 31 A medium-sized municipality is a municipality with 20 000-50 000 inhabitants according to Sveriges kommuner och landsting, Kommunsgruppsindelning (2011).
the highest publicly elected ocial in the municipality when the new website was launched.
The focus on data protection in the development of the new website emerged only after the initial steps to change the website had already been taken [2] .
Because of this, specications which would have been useful to integrate at an earlier stage had to be appended to the specication afterwards (such as removing referrer leaks and using local analytics tools). This caused additional costs for the municipality (a one-time fee of approximately EUR 2000 for the Piwik server). While this is not a large sum, a continuing problem is the lack of qualied Piwik administrators available from subcontractors. Access to third party analytics specialists is simply higher, making it more time-and cost-ecient to use third party analytics tools.
In November 2016, the municipality has still not crossed the TLS hurdle in spite of having a pre-existing cryptographic certicate which was valid across all the municipality's domains when we rst got in touch with them. The provision of municipal maps stopped working when TLS was turned on, but there is ongoing work to x this problem. Changes in sta in summer of 2016 means that many of the planned changed are stuck, while new sta get accustomed to the work environment. The municipality is still not able to obtain a higher grade than D in the Dataskydd.net privacy web check tool.
Other Municipalities
After launching our municipal top list, we have noticed that more municipalities are adopting the use of referrer policy. We have also had questions from municipalities about the use of encryption.
For instance, it is still the case that some web developers fear that encryption may reduce the availability of the site (for instance, making it slower to load and requiring more server resources). While this is not supported in practical knowledge, 32 , and in fact HTTP/2which brings superior performancein practice requires the use of encryption as no major browser supports unencrypted HTTP/2, it's a legacy concern that is likely to remain for some time.
Additionally, and as with many things that may require alterations in current work ows or technical tools, we have noticed that municipalities that are refurbishing their public web environments with data protection enhancements are likely to be concerned that the data protection enhancements are the cause of problems. For instance, use of referrer policy may get the blame for broken links even if, upon careful analysis, it turns out not to have been the problem.
Other questions that have emerged are covered above in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Analysis
The experiences of Enköping indicates that a data protection focus becomes both cheaper and quicker if integrated from the beginning. This provides support for the utility of data protection by design.
32 https://www.maxcdn.com/blog/ssl-performance-myth/ One municipal employee indicated that it would be helpful if some form of procedural standard was developed, equivalent to the standards for web site accessibility which have just been adopted in European law [3] .
It may be assumed that the prevalence of non-third party analytics tool specialists increases if the demand for such services increase. The municipality sta also experienced that the most frequent questions they would face from other municipalities related to their experiences of Piwik. A detailed analysis of municipality websites indicates that Enköping is not alone in trying out selfhosted alternatives to Google Analytics.
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The environment for making changes will dier between municipalities. While Enköping experienced signicant delays in ordering and installing Piwik servers and a low degree of interest in data protection from their IT department, 34 in other municipalities it is the IT department which is responsible for the design and features of the website.
35
We have not received any feedback from private persons who've tried to use our tool to inspire changes in websites that they themselves did not manage.
Conclusions
Many of the tools under development for privacy measurement are primarily used to investigate large numbers of the most popular websites. Our work has focused on a minor subset of websites, those of Swedish municipalities, which were unlikely to be the most visited.
While our goal was to make cost-neutral suggestions for improvements in so far as possible, we found out that even nominally free (gratuite) products or simple changes in the specications for a municipal website may imply signicant enough costs to the municipality that many parts of the municipal administration must be involved in enacting change. The experience of Enköping is that it is doable, but requires considerable eort from responsible civil servants.
The observations from the municipal civil servants are straight-forward, for instance requesting a guideline for data protection friendly developments. But such guidelines are unlikely to be adopted without signicant eort. The tools we developed are not designed to make use of exibilities in the data protection laws, but to provide simple and cheap means to maximise adherence to the principles enshrined in the General Data Protection Regulation Art. 5. Some of our suggestions are more likely to be adopted than others: the number of Swedish municipalities using encrypted connections is increasing, as is the number of Swedish municipalities that introduce a referrer policy. We also believe that adoption of alternative analytics tools will increase, but this will depend on a few front-runners creating a demand for alternative analytics expertise. 35 Informal dialogues with municipal civil servants in other cities.
